Principles are a tool to help us moralize

The point of making principle the master of morality rather than, say, intuition or tradition, is that we can guard against our own cognitive frailties. Whereas our intuitive sense of morality is malleable and easily influenced by our own interests, biases, and psychological needs, rule-like objective principles are outside of us and not subject to these pressures. Principles therefore act as an outside point of reference that we can use to navigate the murky swamps of our own minds.

When we find that we support a position that cannot be satisfactorily justified by principles, it is a clue that we have succumbed to one cognitive frailty or another, and that we need to step back and reassess our position. Though we like to think that an unprincipled position is one that is automatically and necessarily wrong, in practice an unprincipled position is one that is merely highly suspect and invites further reflection.

Note that on this view it is not the case that morality is intrinsically rational. Principles--rational thought--is something separate, a tool that helps us moralize by allowing us to overcome various cognitive biases and blindnesses. Metaphorically, principles are a scaffolding we build for ourselves to give us a view on the moral landscape that we otherwise would not be able to attain.

But the use of rational thought to aid our moralizing can fool us into thinking that morality has properties of rational thought that it doesn't necessarily have. We tend to think, for example, that morality provides an answer for every moral question, and that it is merely a function of wisdom that determines if we find that answer or not. We also tend to think that morality is consistent, and that if properly applied it will tell us that a moral proposition is either true or false, but not both.

But I don't think that morality need be consistent, nor does it necessarily provide an answer for every moral question. Moral dilemmas are not difficult problems with a correct solution, like some kind of mathematical postulation, but rather instances where morality cannot yield an answer. In the same way that our limbs are limited in their movement and cannot bend certain ways, our morality is limited in its application and cannot answer certain questions.

If morality is not intrinsically rational--a set of objective rule-like guidelines that determine right and wrong--then it begs the question of what morality is, exactly. I think the best way to look at it is that morality is something humans do that is a part of their essential nature, like how we eat and love and sing. And like those other idiosyncratic activities, morality is irregular and organic and naturally resistant to logical codification and reductive rules. We can try to create such principles and rules so as to reflect our morality as closely as possible, but we can never abandon our morality to the rules--people make moral decisions, not rules.

In the same way that holding a position not supported by principle is a clue that there is something wrong with the position, relying exclusively upon principle to arrive at a decision is a clue that something has gone wrong with one's moralizing capacity. To be doctrinaire is to be in denial of the moral consequences of one's position: it is a retreat, a willing blindness. An exclusively principled stance means nothing if it is not accompanied by charity, empathy, kindness, and true understanding. Principles are a tool, but to apply principles blindly is like using a tool absent some larger goal. It's like hammering nails into a board for no reason.